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INDUSTRY WATCH
DO
INCENTIVES
WORK?
By Fermin Diez
Achieving business results 
with the right pay scheme.
Much has been said both for and against using 
incentives to drive business results—be it revenue and profit, 
or market share. Despite this, there is surprisingly little 
research, particularly in Asia, to guide practitioners on how 
different pay models affect decisions that lead to better company 
performance. CEOs, Remuneration Committees (RemCos), HR 
executives and executive compensation consultants have been 
searching for the ‘Holy Grail’ of pay-for-performance for a long 
time. And yet, many questions remain unanswered. For instance: 
Do various types of Long-Term Incentives (LTIs) affect the 
achievement of business results differently? By LTIs, we are 
referring to incentives for performance over periods longer 
than one year, which are usually linked to awards in shares. 
Which type of LTI provides the greatest incentive to 
performance? Does changing the pay mix (that is, the relative 
weight of fixed pay, performance bonus and LTIs as a percentage 
of total pay) yield different results regarding performance? 
Which pay mix provides the greatest incentive to performance? 
Besides the traditional pay-for-performance model, there 
are three other pay-for-performance alternatives: Tournament, 
Membership and Bonding models. Are there differences in 
how these models affect performance? Which pay-for-performance 
model provides the greatest incentive to improve business 
results? Are there differences in performance if the incentives 
provided are team-based or individual-based, or if they 
are offered in combination? And which approach—team, 
individual or a combination—provides the greatest incentive 
to improve performance? 
 
There are four different perspectives when addressing 
pay-for-performance in organisations: 
• RemCos worry about governance and link to overall 
company results. 
• CEOs are more concerned about fairness and recognition. 
• HR heads look mostly into market competitiveness 
and retention. 
• Executive pay consultants are concerned with design 
features and buy-in. 
Executive compensation consultants are often tasked 
by RemCos of corporate boards to advise on developing an 
approach to pay their company executives to achieve better 
business performance. However, when it comes to honing in 
on a pay philosophy, these same board members fall back on 
the ‘evidence’ of market data, which shows how and how much 
other companies of similar size or from the same industry pay 
their executives, but does not provide information on whether 
their competitors’ pay plans are effective in driving results. 
There is surprisingly little research, 
particularly in Asia, to guide 
practitioners on how different pay 
models affect decisions that lead 
to better company performance.
For RemCos, pay should not vary so 
much from year to year. And yet, an 
executive pay consultant in Hong Kong 
summarised this state of affairs when he 
said, “Shareholders have their favourite 
plan types; some like specific metrics, 
or specific vehicles and formulae. 
They tend to follow similar designs to 
competitor proxies.” He went on to 
add, “RemCos don’t always have the 
knowledge to make these decisions.”1
At best, paying the same as your 
competitors yields the same degree 
of motivation of the company’s 
executives vis-a-vis the competition, 
rather than gaining any competitive 
advantage. Instead 
of  searching 
for a different 
approach that 
might lead to 
better performance, efforts 
are only channelled into determining key 
performance indicators (KPIs), deciding 
the targets and the timeframe for their 
achievement, providing cash flow/tax 
effective vehicles for delivering pay, 
calculating competitive levels of pay at 
various levels of performance, ensuring 
compliance with regulations, and staying 
close to existing parameters to avoid 
conflicts at the Annual General Meeting 
of shareholders. 
Meanwhile, there are often other 
considerations besides  pay-for-
performance that are frequently ignored. 
A Singapore RemCo chair explained it 
this way, “Pay [for performance] is not 
the only thing, retention is also an 
issue. The CEO might say, ‘If you 
don’t pay me at the 90th percentile 
I won’t work so hard,’ to which we 
would answer, ‘What part of your job 
will you not do?’” To the CEOs, the 
view is starkly different. One of them 
put it this way: “[Pay] can act as a 
de-motivator so [best to] aim for 
satisfaction/motivation as much as you 
can.” The HR executives focus on pay 
more to attract and retain executives. One 
of them indicated, “We want to retain 
first, then motivate to perform. This has 
to be balanced with not encouraging 
risky behaviour.” HR executives typically 
rely on existing market benchmarks, 
some of which are of better quality 
than others, in order to tell their 
RemCos and bosses that they do not 
over/under pay.
In support of the idea that retention 
is a big part of executive pay plan design 
and implementation, researchers 
found that when a CEO leaves a firm, 
compensation for those left behind 
increases by an average of 46 percent.2 
From the perspective of executive pay 
advisors, it is unclear if incentive pay 
plans work as intended. One of them 
expressed doubts in terms of trying to 
create homogeneous plans to motivate 
what is, in effect, a heterogeneous 
population. “‘Designing for the herd’ 
is the safest route both as a consultant 
and as a RemCo chair.”
Long-term versus 
short-term incentives
Asian companies constantly debate about 
the role that LTIs should play in the 
overall employee pay mix, alongside base 
salary and annual bonuses. This debate 
is spurred by the various viewpoints 
from the different stakeholders involved. 
For instance, boards have an interest 
in maximising return on pay and 
minimising risk to their investment. 
This can be achieved by limiting the 
amount of fixed pay (which is a cost 
regardless of performance) and tying 
as much pay as possible to financial 
KPIs (such as total shareholder 
return), particularly over longer periods 
of time. In this way, if the share-
holder wins, he is willing to share 
with management, but if he is losing, 
management is losing as well. A Hong 
Kong RemCo chair stated it this way, 
“Without short-term there is no 
long-term, as decisions made today 
have an impact two or three years 
from now. We must balance the two, 
but it’s very difficult. Share price is 
often beyond management control.” 
Consultants agree that there is a need 
to see if the plan that was implemented 
moved the long-term financial needle 
beyond the ‘rising tide’ of the market 
and industry.
Often, management observes that share 
price movement (the main component 
behind total shareholder return) is not 
always linked to the performance of the 
company, as industry and market factors 
play a role as well. For CEOs, pay plans 
should be, “aligned with the creation of 
shareholder value, but in things [you] can 
control. If you provide consistent 
performance, the market should reward you 
in time. But it is ‘over time’…”
This divergence in viewpoints sets up 
a classic confrontation in the boardroom, 
and consultants are often called in to 
provide a way to mediate this dispute 
(refer to Figure 1). 
Individual versus 
team incentives
Companies also often struggle to find a 
balance between individual incentives 
and team incentives as a motivator of 
performance. Here, again, there is a 
divergence of viewpoints. Whereas for 
the CEO it is straightforward, as the 
company’s performance is also his or her 
personal performance, as soon as you go 
down one level, distinctions start to emerge 
between an individual’s performance and 
the overall team performance. In the 
words of a global CEO headquartered in 
Asia, “The more senior, the more team 
[based], but there needs to be a mix.” 
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FIGURE 1
However, standard practice differs from 
this notion: At the executive level there are 
often no team incentives except for when 
the overall annual bonus pool is based 
on company results for short-term 
incentives, and increases in share price 
are considered an all-of-company result, 
for long-term incentives. 
Both of these approaches have 
detractors as well that hold the view that 
there is “no real way to differentiate 
performance” and thus maintain that 
team results should be balanced with 
individual performance. The corollary 
to this line of reasoning is that balance 
is important as, in their view, having 
only individual incentives could mean too 
much ‘kill all’ behaviour, and too many 
team incentives may foster freeloaders.
For RemCos, the view is that only 
the company’s performance counts, and 
the entire senior management is there to 
ensure overall results are achieved. And 
yet, while agreeing with the company-
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based bonus pool, a Singapore RemCo Chair provided this 
caveat, “The pool is company-based and then [we] need 
to carve it out by individual. But, all individual Balanced 
Score Cards have a big ‘fudge factor’ and, in fact, all RemCos 
fudge a little bit.”
For individual executives, the view is often that if 
they have performed their duties and achieved their individual 
results, this should be rewarded regardless of the company’s 
outcomes. HR and compensation professionals wrestle with 
this problem constantly, as executives with great performance 
but low overall pay are at risk of leaving the company and 
joining its competitors.
Boards, and, more recently, regulators, worry about the 
effects of different long-term vehicles as drivers of performance. 
In the minds of many, linking pay to performance has led 
management teams to seek strategies involving high risks 
and high potential returns that have, at times, resulted in very 
negative effects. Asian RemCo Chairs fear that executives only 
see upside and entitlement with very little clawback. One 
RemCo Chair illustrated this point by recalling a recent 
instance involving GE/Volkswagen: “The guys that caused 
the problem all collected their bonuses and the current ones are 
now punished. This is a huge issue of pay-for-performance. 
But what is the alternative?” As a result, Boards worry a lot 
about shareholder activism, defensibility and governance, so 
they tend to take fewer risks on how to pay executives.
Finally, HR heads all over the world search for the 
compensation plan that will allow their companies to find a 
pay-for-performance model that leads to higher attraction, 
retention and motivation of executives, and to hopefully achieve 
better business results. In an ideal set of circumstances, HR 
would like to come up with pay programmes that meet the 
objectives of the shareholders and executives. However, quite 
often, HR is under pressure to find and keep executives, 
and not so much for delivering performance, which is deemed 
to be the responsibility of the executives and the CEO. 
Thus, HR executives have an inherent bias to side with 
arguments for ‘market data-based’ compensation to discharge 
their attract-retain-motivate duties. They argue that there is 
competition for talent, and firms need to pay to attract and 
retain the talent they seek. Nevertheless, an executive pay 
consultant warns: “No one [has ever] benchmarked themselves 
to a position of market leadership.” 
Need for a research-based approach
The discrepancies in positions and approaches to the near- 
dogma of pay-for-performance are troubling. There is a definite 
need in Asia to apply scientific rigour to the question of how 
best to design executive pay programmes to determine if they 
work at all, and which approach leads to better results. 
In short, there is a need to move from ‘market-based’ to 
‘research-based’ advice.
Academic literature has an abundance of evidence 
on pay-for-performance. However, the evidence is 
inconclusive on two counts: The first is the debate on whether 
money is an extrinsic motivator at all, or if individuals are 
intrinsically motivated. The second unresolved element in 
literature is the impact that different pay mechanisms have 
on performance, if any. 
Agency theory, expectancy theory and equity theory 
all would support the view that incentive pay can motivate 
improved performance. However, other researchers have found 
the data to be inconclusive, and even contradictory.3 This 
can be interpreted as evidence that, at best, incentive pay 
only works to increase performance under specific 
circumstances, such as repetitive tasks where working 
consistently and faster can lead to better results. Proponents 
of this view would then argue that incentives are not effective 
in driving performance based on decision-making. In the 
words of an HR executive, “No amount of incentive pay can 
make people smarter!” Proponents of intrinsic motivation 
argue that incentives can even be counterproductive, which 
is in direct opposition to proponents of these theories.
To complicate matters further, prospect theory—which 
states that people make decisions based on the potential 
value of losses and gains rather than final outcomes, and 
these are evaluated with certain heuristics which bias the 
decisions—supports the idea that incentives impact performance 
in the shape of an ‘S’ curve.4 That is to say, the further ahead 
on results, the less likely executives would be to exert additional 
effort in pursuing better results. Conversely, the further 
behind executives are on results, the more likely they will 
take big risks driven by incentive pay. Finally, while there 
is a general consistency in the literature regarding team 
incentives working to drive performance, there are very 
Linking pay to performance has 
led management teams to seek 
strategies involving high risks and high 
potential returns that have, at times, 
resulted in very negative effects.
few data points comparing individual 
incentives to team incentives as drivers 
of performance. 
Our study
Following research by Ederer & Manso, 
we created an experiment in which 510 
subjects were tasked with running a 
business for 20 periods (iterations).5 
For each period, subjects had to decide 
on the Four “Ps” (Placement, Packaging, 
Product and Price) to maximise profits. 
In making each of their 20 choices, 
subjects could fine-tune the current 
operation (as inherited from the prior 
manager) by adjusting each of the four 
parameters, or they could devise a new 
strategy by making decisions on each 
of the four parameters. Subjects were 
paid under 15 different pay conditions 
to determine which, if any, made any 
difference to their performance. 
Additionally,  the willingness of 
participants to modify their strategies 
was also observed.
The results of our study revealed 
that differences in pay conditions do 
not significantly impact performance. 
Equally, no single approach (e.g., different 
long-term incentive vehicles, varying 
pay mixes, any of the three alternative 
pay-for-performance approaches, one 
of the team incentive designs) has 
a significant performance advantage 
either. However, we do ﬁ nd that, jointly, 
the team approaches we designed 
do significantly outperform all the 
individual approaches. 
An analysis of the patterns of 
responses showed that nearly half of 
all participants stopped seeking more 
profitable alternatives when they were 
ahead in the game. Perhaps more 
importantly, a higher percentage of 
participants changed their strategy 
or ‘took a risk’ when behind. More 
surprising is the fact that nearly 
20 percent of all participants did both 
during the span of the 20 periods 
of the game in the experiment. That 
is to say, the same person took a risk 
and was also conservative, depending 
on where their results were at any point 
in the game. The data also suggests that 
the higher the level of profit attained, 
and the earlier the run in the game to 
achieve that profit, the higher the 
probability of a prospect theory effect 
on the risk aversion side. But, for those 
falling behind, they began ditching 
their current formula and developing 
new strategies.
Further analysis of the data reveals 
that, for all individual conditions, the 
level of profit at which individuals risk 
when behind or stop when ahead is 
equivalent. These results suggest that 
the perceived risk is not inherent in any 
of the pay conditions. The implication 
of this result is that being risk-prone or 
risk-averse can be construed to be 
circumstantial rather than strictly a 
personality trait. In the words of an 
executive pay consultant, “the good 
thing, and the bad thing, about incentives, 
is that they drive behaviour!” In this 
case, risking when behind but also being 
conservative when ahead differs from 
what is normally expected, that incentives 
always drive behavior in the same way.
Other interesting findings derived 
from the experiment were that LTI 
approaches were more efficient when 
looking at the period 20 results, whereas 
the three performance models’ approaches 
were more efficient when considering 
average results during the 20 periods. 
This result has implications when designing 
executive incentive plans. Perhaps, if 
there is no added performance increase 
that can be expected from any plan 
design (except for team incentives), 
then simple plans should be more the 
norm. Moreover, LTI-based plans will be 
cheaper to run (providing ‘more bang 
Team 
incentives 
work
Worry less 
about the 
rest
Targets frame 
expected 
results
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for the buck’) and, therefore, preferable 
to less efficient and, as demonstrated, 
equally effective alternatives.
Applying the 
research to address 
pay-for-performance
The current approaches to executive 
incentive plan design have left 
stakeholders on all sides concerned, 
confused and, at times, disillusioned 
with the results. On the one hand, 
practitioners worry that incentives may 
lead executives to be highly motivated 
but still reach poor outcomes. On the 
other hand, the perception is that results 
are not appropriately linked to the 
payout. Consequently, the ability of 
incentives to motivate performance 
is questioned. One of the CEOs we 
interviewed expressed it this way, 
“Incentives create too much angst. 
Having a competitive [pay] package 
is key, with only plus/minus 10 percent 
variation for individual performance. 
We pay for attraction and retention, 
and hope for business results. We 
adjust the pay levels to ensure that 
turnover [of staff] is within what we 
expect.” A RemCo Chair added: “Pay 
will not make an inventor invent more, 
but if he does, will he get his fair share? 
Pay-for-performance is not what it is 
geared up to be; it should be more 
about a sense of fairness.” 
Our study provides empirically 
derived data on the effectiveness of 
often-used pay schemes, as a means to 
achieving higher company performance. 
One actionable outcome is that target 
setting has a greater impact on results 
than plan design. In line with prospect 
theory, as well as goal setting theory,6 
stretch targets yield better results than 
average targets. Another implication 
of our study is that executive incentive 
plan design should focus on team 
incentives, as this approach is clearly 
superior to incentivise the achievement 
of business outcomes. The results 
also suggest that team incentive plans 
should be based on shared goals 
for maximum impact on business 
performance. How the team incentives 
are weighed seems less important in 
this respect. Our study also indicated 
that LTI plan designs could have 
a slight edge over other models, 
due to their higher ROI. Yet, perhaps 
LTI plans can be best used in a 
team context, or for executive retention 
purposes. A final implication of the 
study is that no amount of tweaking on 
any of the other elements of pay plan 
design seems to have any impact on 
performance. Thus, practitioners can 
focus on the elements of design 
mentioned above and worry less about 
the rest.
The study is limited insofar as it 
deals with relatively small amounts 
of money as fees, when compared to 
larger amounts of rewards in corporate 
executive pay packages. Furthermore, 
our LTI ‘share’ plans do not convey 
stock ownership, or a sense of 
‘discounted expected future cash fl ows’, 
which company shares may convey. 
At any rate, we believe that the way 
the fee mechanisms were set up in our 
experiment adequately emulate 
the way LTI programmes 
behave in practice, since, for 
small companies at least, 
they tend to be based on 
a revenue-multiplier 
(or sometimes EBIT 
or EBITDA) formula, 
akin to our design. A 
variation would be to study 
if the conditions hold under different 
revenue-multiple scenarios to 
emulate differences in business 
values by industry. Another limitation 
of the current work is that the 
experimental design was not best 
suited for testing prospect theory. 
In an ideal setting, the game should be 
designed so that, for some subjects, 
early results would always be negative, 
and for others it would always be 
positive. That way, we could study 
the behaviour of all subjects who were 
presented with the same positive, or 
negative, stimuli, so that we can better 
compare the results. Perhaps additional 
research could address this issue.
Our findings are of use to RemCos, executive pay consultants, CEOs and 
HR professionals, in designing incentive programmes. One international executive 
pay consultant, who saw the results of the experiment, had this to say, “Given 
these results, I will provide greater weight towards team incentives [in future 
plan designs]. What gets measured gets done, but [the results indicate] it is not 
related to the amount or the plan design, but to the team goals. I would still split 
pay mix 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 but what will change is the team metric component. And 
I would not do away with share plan designs, but ensure the awards are based 
on team metrics.” Another consultant in the region suggested that, given these 
results, a more informed approach would be to use individual performance only for 
base pay increases and promotions, and make all incentives team-based. An HR executive 
in Hong Kong added: “[Individual incentives] are like adding sugar to the candy 
floss machine; it makes things go haywire! The best option is to simplify the plans.” 
These executives, among others, are seeing the benefits of a premeditated 
approach to addressing pay-for-performance. It starts with recognising the limitations 
of current pay plan design and then developing a pragmatic pay programme that 
includes market data, governance requirements, and pay package competitiveness. 
Finally, these incentive plans will need to be tweaked to achieve a blend of 
results—from better performance to higher retention and adequate pay governance. 
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